R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel Ex Parte Tait 2009

FACTS:-

The Claimant was a police officer. On the 4th March 2003, he was injured when he was engaged in the pursuit of a stolen car. The driver of the stolen car rammed his vehicle twice. In May 2003 he applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority for compensation. At first his injuries were rejected as not being sufficiently serious to qualify for an award under the Scheme. He applied for a review and then appealed, which appeal was rejected. One of the grounds for rejection was that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel (“CICAP”) did not think that the claim should qualify because of the terms of Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the 2001 Scheme. The issues were:-

a)    whether the vehicle was used so as deliberately to inflict, or attempt to inflict injury, and
b)    whether it could be said that the Claimant was taking an exceptional risk that was justified in all the circumstances

The CICAP concluded that the car chase was routine and no exceptional risk had been taken. In addition, the Applicant’s own opinion that the driver of the stolen car was trying to injure the police was not supported by evidence.

JUDGMENT

Stadlen J went over the facts of the case and the terms of the 2001 Scheme.Paragraph 11 stated:-

“A personal injury is not a criminal injury for the purposes of this Scheme where the injury is attributable to the use of a vehicle, except where the vehicle was used so as to deliberately inflict, or attempt to inflict injury on any person.”

Paragraph 12 also precluded the following situations from compensation:-

“Where any injury is sustained accidentally by a person who is engaged in:-

(a) any of the law-enforcement activities described in paragraph 8(c),
(b) any other activity directed to containing, limiting or remedying the consequences of a crime, compensation will not be payable unless the person injured was at the time he sustained the injury taking an exceptional risk which was justified in all the circumstances.”

The Claimant’s eligibility to apply for compensation was thus dependent on the answer to the question as to whether the vehicle which rammed the police car was used so as to deliberately inflict, or attempt to inflict injury on any person. The answer to that question depended on two further questions. First what was the state of mind of the driver of the other car? Secondly did that state of mind show that the car was used so as to deliberately inflict or attempt to inflict injury on any person. The first question was a question of fact and the second question was a question of law.

The CICAP had approach the first question by looking at the driver’s motive, but not his intention. The Guide to the 2001 Scheme said:-

“The general rule is that we cannot pay compensation for injuries caused as a result of traffic accidents. The only exception is if the vehicle was used as a weapon. In general we have to be satisfied that the driver of the vehicle deliberately drove at you.”

Stadlen J said that if a vehicle was used to ram another car for the purpose of causing so much damage to it as to disable it, that was not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that the car was being used as a weapon. The Guide to the 2001 Scheme did not focus on the specific question, namely whether paragraph 11 of the Scheme was intended to exclude from the definition of criminal injury an injury directly attributable to the use of a vehicle by which the driver intended to inflict or attempt to inflict injury on any person even though that was not his motive.

The Claimant’s counsel had referred to the case of Waide, Re Judicial Review [2008] NICA 1 where the Applicant was knocked over by an untraced motorcycle in a public park, who appeared on the evidence to be simply trying to frighten her.  She could not make a claim to the Motor Insurers Bureau because the accident had not occurred on a “road”. The Court of Appeal had said that the essential question was whether the Applicant had suffered injury as a result of a deliberate intention to inflict injury on her. Under the terms of the Scheme, there had to be a direct link between the intention of the perpetrator and the infliction or the attempted infliction of the injury.  Therefore the Applicant’s claim to the CICA failed.

However there was an important factual distinction between the circumstances in Waide and this case. In Waide the victim was not in a car and the driver of the motorcycle had intended to veer away. As a matter of common sense it seemed obvious that if a car was used as a battering ram, the natural and probable consequence would be some degree of physical injury.

The Claimant’s counsel relied on two cases, Charlton v Fisher [2002] QB 578 and Hardy v MIB [1964] 2 QB 745 where the court had said that a driving deliberately using his car as a weapon should be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his acts. Where it was proved on the balance of probabilities that the driver of the other car in fact foresaw that the occupants would be injured, he could not be heard to say that he did not intend that injury.

The CICA Scheme stated that the general rules was that they could not pay compensation for injuries caused as a result of traffic accidents. Furthermore the Scheme stated at paragraph 19 of its Guide:-

“Police officers injured in traffic accidents during car chases are not usually considered to be eligible for compensation unless there was another exceptionally risky factor, such as very bad weather conditions.”

However this was not a case of reckless or careless driving, in which case the Motor Insurers Bureau might be approached. The intention here was to hit the Claimant’s car with such force as to disable it. Although injuring the Claimant was not his motive, it was his intention. Therefore in those circumstances, it did seem that it was intended that a person in the position of the Claimant would fall within the class of persons who were eligible for compensation under the CICA Scheme.

Therefore the CICAP had erred in law. Their decision would be quashed and the Claimant’s case should be remitted for a determination on compensation.